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VIOLENT CRIME AND PUNITIVENESS:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF PUBLIC OPINION
MICHAEL O’HEAR* & DARREN WHEELOCK**
Evidence suggests that the public favors tough punishment for individuals
who have been convicted of violent crimes, but why? In order to better
understand the factors that contribute to punitive attitudes toward violent
crime, or “V-punitiveness,” we analyze data from a recent survey of Wisconsin
voters as a part of the Marquette Law School Poll. In sum, respondents
generally supported prison terms for individuals convicted of violent crime, but
this support was not unwavering and unconditional. While analysis of these
data identified several variables that correspond with higher levels of Vpunitiveness, neither fear of violent crime nor personal experiences were
among them. Instead, V-punitiveness seems more closely tied to broader sets
of social beliefs regarding individual responsibility, traditional values, and the
like. Our results suggest that tough responses to violent crime may be
supported more for expressive than instrumental reasons. Thus, efforts to
change public policy in this area may need to contend with expressive
considerations. If reformers wish to change minds about legal responses to
violent crime, instrumental arguments based simply on “what works” in
reducing violent recidivism may come up short.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two decades of effort to roll back mass incarceration in the United States
have achieved only modest reductions in the national imprisonment rate,1 which
remains more than four times higher than historic norms.2 Reforms have been
hampered by their tendency to focus on reducing the incarceration of
“nonviolent” offenders.3 However, more than half of state prisoners—indeed,
perhaps far more than half, depending on how the counting is done—have been
convicted of violent crimes.4 Consequently, a true reversal of mass
incarceration will almost certainly require changes in the way that the criminaljustice system responds to violence. Achieving such changes may, in turn,
depend on the development of a deeper understanding of why the system has
come to rely so heavily on long terms of imprisonment in cases of violent crime.
Much of the research on the causes of mass incarceration has focused on a
late-twentieth-century surge in public punitiveness.5 This punitiveness has
been expressed, for instance, in public opinion surveys in which large majorities
indicate support for harsher sentences.6 A sizeable literature now provides
much insight into the nature of public punitiveness as a general phenomenon.7
By and large, however, this literature does not distinguish between punitiveness
toward all crime and punitiveness toward violent crime in particular. While
some studies do indicate that public attitudes tend to be harsher toward violent
than nonviolent crime,8 there has been little systematic effort to consider the
sources of that harshness. Yet, it seems likely that public punitiveness toward

1. MICHAEL O’HEAR, THE FAILED PROMISE OF SENTENCING REFORM, at xiv–xv (2017)
[hereinafter O’HEAR, FAILED PROMISE].
2. MICHAEL O’HEAR, PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: EXAMINING THE FACTS 167
(2018) [hereinafter O’HEAR, PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT].
3. O’HEAR, FAILED PROMISE, supra note 1, at 198.
4. Id.
5. Aaron Gottlieb, The Effect of Message Frames on Public Attitudes Toward Criminal Justice
Reform for Nonviolent Offenses, 63 CRIME & DELINQ. 636, 637 (2017).
6. One leading national survey, the General Social Survey, regularly asks respondents whether
they think that courts “deal too harshly or not harshly enough with criminals.” O’HEAR, PRISONS AND
PUNISHMENT, supra note 2, at 206. Going back to the 1970’s, large majorities have responded “not
harshly enough,” with figures ranging from 57% to 87%. Id.
7. See infra Section II.A.
8. See infra Section II.C.
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violent offenses (“V-punitiveness,” by way of shorthand) has contributed to the
severity of the sentences that are imposed for such crimes.9
In this Article, through original empirical research, we seek to elucidate the
nature of V-punitiveness, teasing out similarities and differences in public
attitudes toward violent and nonviolent crime. Our findings are based on a
telephone survey of voters in Wisconsin, an important “swing” state whose
political divides parallel those of the nation as a whole.10
In brief, we find that respondents’ punitiveness toward violent offenders is
connected to broader ideas about social organization, individual responsibility,

9. Cf. Peter K. Enns, The Public’s Increasing Punitiveness and Its Influence on Mass
Incarceration in the United States, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 857, 858 (2014) (“[T]he public’s increasing
punitiveness has been a primary determinant of the incarceration rate and . . . shifts in the public’s
punitiveness appear to have preceded shifts in congressional attention to criminal justice issues.”).
There are at least two important vectors by which public attitudes toward crime can be translated into
criminal-justice outcomes. First, legislators have electoral incentives to advance—or at least not
oppose—general policies that conform to the preferences of their constituents. Second, prosecutors,
judges, parole board members, and other discretionary actors in the criminal-justice system also have
incentives to follow public preferences as they engage in case-by-case decision making. Some of these
actors, especially the judges and head prosecutors in state systems, are also elected and thus face
political pressures that are similar to those of legislators. See Justin T. Pickett, Public Opinion and
Criminal Justice Policy: Theory and Research, 2 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 405, 418–19 (2019)
(“Most states hold judicial elections . . . . Chief prosecutors . . . are elected in all states except Alaska,
Connecticut, and New Jersey, but even in these states they are still appointed by an elected attorney
general.” (citations omitted)). Other discretionary actors, such as line prosecutors and parole board
members, may not themselves be elected, but they still work within government agencies that are
subject to various forms of political oversight and accountability, in which a lack of sensitivity to public
attitudes may prove quite damaging to one’s career prospects. O’HEAR, FAILED PROMISE, supra note
1, at 13. Additionally, it has been observed that “[l]egal decision makers drawn from jurisdictions with
high levels of support for punitive sanctions may be more likely to hold such views themselves.” Eric
P. Baumer & Kimberly H. Martin, Social Organization, Collective Sentiment, and Legal Sanctions in
Murder Cases, 119 AM. J. SOC. 131, 143 (2013). Discretionary actors may also be motivated to follow
public preferences in order to maintain the legitimacy of their institutions. Pickett, supra, at 419.
Although legislators and the professionals who work in the system are probably the most important
mediators between public attitudes and criminal-justice outcomes, we might also note the potential
significance of direct democracy (ballot initiatives) in some states, as well as jury decision making. Id.
For a recent summary of the research on “criminal justice responsiveness” to changes in public
punitiveness, see id. at 419–21.
10. See, e.g., Michael O’Hear & Darren Wheelock, Imprisonment Inertia and Public Attitudes
Toward “Truth in Sentencing”, 2015 BYU L. REV. 257, 260 n.15 (reviewing close elections in
Wisconsin since 2000). In 2016, Republican presidential candidate Donald J. Trump eked out a narrow
victory in Wisconsin, which helped to seal his national victory. John Nichols, The States That Elected
NATION
(Nov.
8,
2018),
Trump
Have
Turned
Against
Him,
THE
https://www.thenation.com/article/wisconsin-michigan-pennsylvania-ohio-midterms-trumpdemocrats/ [https://perma.cc/6LBH-W68C]. But, just two years later, Wisconsin elected a Democrat
as governor and returned a Democrat to the United State Senate. Id.
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and perceived group differences. More specifically, we find that Vpunitiveness is associated with political conservatism, racial resentment, and
authoritarianism. By contrast, we find no connection between V-punitiveness
and prior victimization, fear of crime, or county-level crime trends. We find
limited evidence of relationships between V-punitiveness and county-level
demographics and respondent perceptions of community circumstances. On
the whole, our findings tend to echo the prior research on general punitiveness.
Similarly, we find that V-punitiveness shares much in common with
punitiveness toward property crime (“P-punitiveness”), although our results do
point to some differences between the two.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II summarizes prior research on
punitiveness and related topics. Part III presents our hypotheses. Part IV
describes our methodology. Part V presents our results. Part VI considers
implications of our findings. Finally, Part VII concludes.
II. PRIOR RESEARCH ON PUBLIC PUNITIVENESS
“Punitiveness” is not always clearly or precisely defined in the relevant
social-science literature,11 but the term is generally used to connote support for
what most laypeople would recognize as “tough-on-crime” policies.12 Thus,

11. See An Adriaenssen & Ivo Aertsen, Punitive Attitudes: Towards an Operationalization to
Measure Individual Punitivity in a Multidimensional Way, 12 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 92, 92–93 (2015)
(“[T]here is no clear definition of what exactly punitivity means . . . . The concept of punitivity stays
rather undertheorized, and different researchers give different meanings to the term.” (citations
omitted)).
12. Cf. Edward Maguire & Devon Johnson, The Structure of Public Opinion on Crime Policy:
Evidence From Seven Caribbean Nations, 17 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 502, 507 (2015) (“Punitive
attitudes are those that support policies intended to punish offenders for their misdeeds.”). One
uncertain question is how support for punitiveness should be conceptualized in relation to support for
rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals who commit crimes, or support for policies that aim to
prevent crime by alleviating socioeconomic disadvantage, mental illness, addiction, and the like.
Policies that focus on rehabilitation, reintegration, and prevention are sometimes referred to
collectively as “progressive.” It is not clear, though, whether punitiveness and progressiveness should
be thought of as diametrically opposed attitudes. Some research on punitiveness is premised on the
assumption that “people’s attitudes can be located on a unidimensional continuum, with punitive
attitudes on one end and nonpunitive or progressive attitudes on the other end.” Id. at 503. Yet, in
reality, “most people express strong support for punitive and progressive policies,” which suggests that
public opinion on criminal justice may be multidimensional. Id. at 503–04. Indeed, and perhaps
counterintuitively, some researchers have theorized that punitiveness and progressiveness may be
positively correlated with one another. Id. at 510. They contend that both attitudes may be grounded
in feelings of human sympathy—punitiveness in sympathy toward crime victims, and progressiveness
in sympathy toward crime perpetrators. Id. If this is true, then a person with strong tendencies to feel
sympathy for others might be predisposed to favor both punitive and progressive policies. Some
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for instance, researchers commonly rely on public opinion surveys that ask
about support for the death penalty, three-strikes laws, or harsher sentences in
general.13
Aggregate responses to such questions suggest that American punitiveness
reached a peak in the 1990s, but has diminished somewhat in more recent
years.14 Nonetheless, in absolute terms, support for some punitive policies
support for this view has been found in a study of public opinion in seven Caribbean nations. Id. at
510, 519.
On the other hand, other researchers have suggested that concurrent support for both punitive and
progressive policies may result from “acquiescence bias” among survey respondents—that is, the
tendency for some individuals to respond favorably to questions without regard to their content. Justin
T. Pickett & Thomas Baker, The Pragmatic American: Empirical Reality or Methodological Artifact?,
52 CRIMINOLOGY 195, 196 (2014).
Instead of focusing on policy preferences, some researchers study punitiveness by reference to
preferred purposes of punishment. “In general, individuals who are supportive of retribution,
incapacitation and deterrence are considered more punitive than people who are in favour of
rehabilitation and restoration.” Adriaenssen & Aertsen, supra note 11, at 94.
13. Mark D. Ramirez, Punitive Sentiment, 51 CRIMINOLOGY 329, 336 (2013). These common
questions do reflect an ambiguity in the way that “punitiveness” is conceptualized in the research: that
is, whether punitiveness should be thought of as an absolute preference for certain kinds of penal
outcomes (e.g., imposition of the death penalty on murderers) or as a preference for change in the
direction of greater severity (e.g., harsher sentences in general). To the extent that punitiveness implies
a preference for change, then it is important to note that relative differences in punitiveness between
individuals or over time may result from differences in the perceived penal baseline, rather than
differences in absolute preferences. For instance, if person X indicates support for harsher sentences,
while person Y does not, it may be that Y is simply better-informed about the severity of current
sentencing practices, rather than that Y is more lenient than X. Cf. Kevin M. Drakulich & Eileen M.
Kirk, Public Opinion and Criminal Justice Reform: Framing Matters, 15 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
171, 172 (2016) (“We know . . . that support for punitive measures is . . . often based on an
overestimation of the lenience of the current system.” (citations omitted)); Adriaenssen & Aertsen,
supra note 11, at 97 (“[P]ublic sentencing preferences are very similar to those expressed by the
judiciary or actually used by the courts.”). The questions in our own study blend absolute preferences
and change preferences.
Although public opinion surveys, typically administered by telephone or on-line, are commonly
utilized to study punitiveness, it is important to bear in mind that they are subject to a variety of
limitations and pitfalls as a means of discerning attitudes. See id.; Drakulich & Kirk, supra, at 172
(“Our understanding of public opinion is also shaped in powerful ways by the choice of topics and
questions, as well as the wording of the questions themselves.”); Pickett & Baker, supra note 12, at
196 (discussing acquiescence bias). For a discussion of other methodologies used to study public
attitudes, see Adriaenssen & Aertsen, supra note 11, at 95–97.
14. For instance, in one series of polls, support for harsher sentencing dropped from 85% in 1994
to 62% in 2012. Mark D. Ramirez, Americans’ Changing Views on Crime and Punishment, 77 PUB.
OPINION Q. 1006, 1011 (2013). Note, however, the theoretical possibility that this trend could result
from shifting perceptions of baseline severity, rather than reduced punitiveness in absolute terms. See
id. at 1011–12 (“The decline in support for tougher sentencing could be a reaction to the growing
number of conservative judges on both federal and state courts . . . .”). On the other hand, the decline

OHEAR_WHEELOCK_12MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1040

MARQUETTE LAW REIVEW

5/14/2020 4:45 PM

[103:1035

remains substantial,15 which may serve as an impediment to further reform and
greater reductions in the national imprisonment rate.16 In any event,
punitiveness continues to attract considerable interest from social scientists,
with several notable new articles continuing to appear annually.
A. Predictors of Punitiveness
A large body of scholarship attempts to identify attitudes and demographic
characteristics that are associated with punitiveness. Researchers typically use
multivariate regression analysis to test whether there is an association between
punitiveness (dependent variable) and other specific factors (independent
variables) and estimate the magnitude of the relationships.17 For instance, one
consistent finding is that individuals who have a conservative political
orientation are more likely to express support for punitive criminal-justice
policies, even after statistically controlling for a variety of other individual and
Likewise, related work shows that
aggregate level characteristics.18
authoritarian values are also associated with punitiveness.19
in support for harsher sentences in general parallels a similar drop in support for capital punishment
for murderers. Id. at 1012. This suggests that the apparent diminution in American punitiveness over
the past quarter-century has not been entirely caused by changing perceptions of current sentencing
practices.
15. See id. at 1011–12 (indicating that, in 2012, 62% of respondents favored harsher sentences
in general, while 63% favored the death penalty in cases of murder). More recent estimates of capital
punishment support indicate that the proportion of respondents that report supporting the policy has
fallen to 49% in 2016 and 54% in 2018. J. Baxter Oliphant, Public Support for the Death Penalty
Ticks Up, PEW RES. CTR: FACTTANK (June 11, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/06/11/us-support-for-death-penalty-ticks-up-2018/ [https://perma.cc/4BVL-VG4D].
16. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that there is some uncertainty about the extent to
which political and media leaders follow, as opposed to shape, public punitiveness. See Drakulich &
Kirk, supra note 13, at 172–73 (summarizing research supporting view that “punitive attitudes are a
social construction”). But cf. Pickett, supra note 9, at 422 (“[T]he amount of [traditional media]
coverage closely follows the crime rate. As a consequence, people receive a greater number of
punitiveness-inducing media frames as crime increases.”)
17. Unless otherwise indicated, the findings discussed in this Article are based on multiple
regression analyses employing an appropriate array of control variables, with “statistical significance”
denoting a likelihood of under 5% that findings result from random variation (p < 0.05).
18. James D. Unnever & Francis T. Cullen, The Social Sources of Americans’ Punitiveness: A
Test of Three Competing Models, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 99, 112 (2010). This finding might be explained
by reference to the conservative emphasis on individual responsibility. See Steven Stack, Liqun Cao,
& Amy Adamzyck, Crime Volume and Law and Order Culture, 24 JUST. Q. 291, 295–96 (2007)
(“Conservatives tend to see criminals as individuals who are responsible for their acts and, therefore,
deserve to be punished.” (citation omitted)).
19. Unnever & Cullen, supra note 18, at 112. Individuals with authoritarian tendencies are said
to “place more importance on submitting to figures of authority and following traditional arrangements
as opposed to valuing individual autonomy and principles of fairness.” Carolyn Côté-Lussier & Jason
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Attitudes toward race also seem connected to punitiveness. In particular,
white feelings of resentment toward blacks have proven an especially robust
predictor of white punitiveness.20 Racial resentment is typically measured
using a standard set of questions asking whether respondents agree with
statements like, “Irish, Italians, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame
prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any
special favors.”21 Such views are sometimes termed “modern racism,” as
contrasted with the more virulent and explicit forms of racism that seem to have
been more prevalent in earlier eras.22 It is thought that modern racism is
associated with punitiveness because of widespread assumptions about which
people will bear the brunt of tougher criminal-justice policies: that is, since
African-Americans are commonly seen as responsible for a disproportionate

T. Carmichael, Public Support for Harsh Criminal Justice Policy and Its Moral and Ideological Tides,
24 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y & L. 235, 235 (2018). “[T]hreat and fear have been theorized to play an
important role in the activation of authoritarian behavior and the expression of authoritarian attitudes.”
Matthew C. MacWilliams, Who Decides When The Party Doesn’t? Authoritarian Voters and the Rise
of Donald Trump, 49 PS 716, 717 (2016) (citations omitted). However, researchers are divided over
whether “[a]uthoritarian behavior is activated ‘when needed’ in reaction to a particular threat,” or
whether “authoritarians are in a state of constant hypervigilance and hold authoritarian attitudes even
when physical or normative threats are not extant.” Id.
20. James. D. Unnever, Francis T. Cullen, & Bonnie S. Fisher, “A Liberal Is Someone Who Has
Not Been Mugged”: Criminal Victimization and Political Beliefs, 24 JUST. Q. 309, 315 (2007). Some
research suggests that racial attitudes are more important in predicting punitiveness among political
liberals and moderates than conservatives. Elizabeth K. Brown, Kelly M. Socia, & Jasmine R. Silver,
Conflicted Conservatives, Punitive Views, and Anti-Black Racial Bias 1974–2014, 21 PUNISHMENT &
SOC’Y 3, 19 (2019) (“These findings are consistent with a threshold effect in which conservatives are
most likely to be more punitive regardless of other factors . . . .” (citation omitted)).
21. Unnever & Cullen, supra note 18, at 111. Although this battery of questions is commonly
used as a measure of racial resentment or animus, some scholars believe that the significance of these
questions has been mischaracterized. Riley K. Carney & Ryan D. Enos, Conservatism and Fairness
in Contemporary Politics: Unpacking the Psychological Underpinnings of Modern Racism 2 (2017),
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/rkcarney/files/carneyenos.pdf [https://perma.cc/SFN9-VLAA]. One
recent study explored the significance of high and low scores on the resentment questions by asking
respondents the same questions about a variety of non-black racial and ethnic groups. Id. at 10. For
instance, some respondents were asked if they agreed that “Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other
minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. The Bhutanese should do the same without
any special favors.” Id. at 9. Conservatives proved to have high resentment scores across the board,
id. at 17, suggesting that high scores may have less to do with animus toward African-Americans per
se than more general feelings of resentment toward out groups and a conservative ideological
preference for personal responsibility. Conversely, liberals tended to respond quite differently when
asked about blacks than they did when asked about other groups, id., suggesting that low resentment
scores in the conventional black-only battery may indeed be tied to particular (liberal, sympathetic)
attitudes about African-Americans.
22. Id. at 2.
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share of crime,23 it is likely assumed that they will experience a disproportionate
share of harsher punishments, too.24 Thus, supporting punitive policies may be
seen as an indirect way to inflict greater penal harm and more rigorous social
control on African-Americans.25 Indeed, one experimental study found that
respondents were more likely to support punitive policies when they were led
to believe that African-Americans comprise a larger share of the prison
population than was actually the case, as compared to other respondents who
were given a more accurate sense of the racial demographics of the prison
population.26
Complementing modern racism may be the perception among some white
people that their socioeconomic status or safety is threatened by AfricanAmericans. More specifically, the racial threat hypothesis predicts that as the
black population in a community or jurisdiction grows relative to the white
population, whites will feel threatened by perceived risks of inter-racial crime
and violence or by inter-racial economic competition and black demands for
limited public resources.27 These perceptions of threat, in turn, may fuel
increased demands by whites for social control—i.e., punitiveness. The racial
threat hypothesis has found some support in the empirical literature. For
instance, one national study found a statistically significant association between
punitiveness and growth in the African-American population of the

23. This misperception has been found in many public opinion surveys. See NAZGOL
GHANDNOOSH, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT: RACIAL PERCEPTIONS OF
CRIME AND SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE POLICIES 13–14 (2014) (summarizing research and observing,
“[r]acial minorities commit certain crimes at higher rates than whites, but whites overestimate these
differences.”).
24. See Unnever & Cullen, supra note 18, at 119 (“[T]his finding suggests that a prominent
reason for the American public’s punitiveness—including the embrace of mass imprisonment and the
death penalty—is the belief that those disproportionately subject to these harsh sanctions are people
they do not like: African American offenders.”).
25. See id.
26. Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L. Eberhardt, Racial Disparities in Incarceration Increase
Acceptance of Punitive Policies, 25 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1949, 1950–51 (2014). Similarly, in another study,
researchers found that “stating that the death penalty is disproportionately applied to AfricanAmericans induced a 12 percentage point increase in support for capital punishment among whites.”
Ryden Butler, Brendan Nyhan, Jacob M. Montgomery & Michelle Torres, Revisiting White Backlash:
Does Race Affect Death Penalty Opinion?, RES. & POL., Jan.–Mar. 2018, at 1, 1 (emphasis in the
original). However, a more recent study with a larger number of respondents failed to find this “white
backlash” effect. Id. at 2–4.
27. Ryan D. King & Darren Wheelock, Group Threat and Social Control: Race, Perceptions of
Minorities and the Desire to Punish, 85 SOC. FORCES 1255, 1260 (2007).
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respondent’s county of residence.28 The researchers also found that
punitiveness was associated with perceptions that African-Americans pose a
greater threat to public order and safety than other groups, and that AfricanAmericans take away resources that should go to others.29 Indeed, these
perceptions seemed to account for much of the association between
punitiveness and African-American population growth.30
Some researchers have also explored whether punitiveness is tied to one’s
attitudes about the moral quality of one’s community, which may be understood
on either a neighborhood level or higher (e.g., city, state, or nation). For
instance, one study included a battery of questions about the perceived direction
of the nation’s moral climate; higher values on the resulting scale “indicate[d]
that individuals felt a greater angst about whether their society was in a state of
moral decline.”31 The researchers did find an association between perceived
moral decline and punitiveness, even after statistically controlling for political
conservatism and authoritarianism.32 However, when researchers added other
variables to the regression analysis—most notably, racial resentment—moral
decline was no longer statistically significant, which suggests that racial
attitudes may play a more fundamental role in driving punitiveness.33

28. Id. at 1268. Interestingly, though, there was no such association between punitiveness and
static percent African-American. “This finding is consistent with prior work suggesting that intergroup conflict is a function of relative change in social circumstances as opposed to static,
contemporaneous conditions.” Id. at 1272 (citation omitted). While the King and Wheelock study
explored the relationship between minority threat and punitive attitudes, several other studies have
looked for a relationship between minority threat and punitive outcomes in the criminal-justice system,
with mixed results. Steven N. Zane, Exploring the Minority Threat Hypothesis for Juveniles in
Criminal Court: Static Versus Dynamic Threat and Diffuse Versus Targeted Effects, 16 YOUTH
VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 418, 420–21 (2017).
29. King & Wheelock, supra note 27, at 1268.
30. Id. at 1269. Although most of the minority threat research has focused on AfricanAmericans as the perceived threat, a small but growing literature finds that similar dynamics may also
exist as to Latinx individuals. Eric A. Stewart, Ramiro Martinez Jr., Eric P. Baumer, & Marc Gertz,
The Social Context of Latino Threat and Punitive Latino Sentiment, 62 SOC. PROBS. 68, 72, 82 (2015).
31. Unnever & Cullen, supra note 18, at 111.
32. Id. at 115.
33. Id. at 116–17. Although moral decline lost its significance as a predictor of general
punitiveness, it remained significant with respect to support for the death penalty. In an older, muchcited study, researchers attempted to determine the attitudinal “antecedents” of support for California’s
notoriously draconian “three strikes and you are out” law. Tom R. Tyler & Robert J. Boeckmann,
Three Strikes and You Are Out, But Why? The Psychology of Public Support for Punishing Rule
Breakers, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 237 (1997). They found that support for three strikes was associated
with perceptions of declining “moral cohesion” in society, as reflected in views about the family and
about the impact of diversity. Id. at 253–55.
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Research is also mixed on the effects of exposure to crime or fear of crime
as predictors of punitiveness. Perhaps counterintuitively, past victimization, in
and of itself, is not associated with increased punitiveness.34 However, there is
some support in the literature, albeit inconsistent, for the hypothesis that
personal fear of crime or perceived risk of future victimization contributes to
punitiveness.35 There is also some research to suggest that an elevated or
increasing crime rate in a community—whether actual or just perceived—may
lead to increased punitiveness among residents.36
34. See Gary Kleck & Dylan Baker Jackson, Does Crime Cause Punitiveness?, 63 CRIME &
DELINQ. 1572, 1577 (2017) (“There has been far more agreement regarding the influence of
individuals’ personal victimization experiences—researchers generally find no impact.”). Some
studies consider the impact of “vicarious victimization,” that is, victimization of a respondent’s family
members or acquaintances, with mixed results. Matthew J. Dolliver, Jennifer L. Kenney, Lesley
Williams Reid, & Ariane Prohaska, Examining the Relationship Between Media Consumption, Fear
of Crime, and Support for Controversial Criminal Justice Policies Using a Nationally Representative
Sample, 34 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 399, 404 (2018).
35. See, e.g., Kleck & Jackson, supra note 34, at 1577 (summarizing prior research on impact of
fear and perceived risk, and observing inconsistent results from study to study); Unnever, Cullen, &
Fisher, supra note 20, at 325 (finding association between respondent’s punitiveness and respondent’s
fear of walking in neighborhood at night). But see Kleck & Jackson, supra note 34, at 1590 (finding
no association between level of fear or perceived risk and preferred sentence lengths for four crimes).
Fear of crime and perceived risk are related, but potentially distinguishable, concepts. See Dolliver,
Kenney, Williams Reid, & Prohaska, supra note 34, at 406 (“Fear of crime is considered more
emotionally driven, whereas perception of risk is more of an intellectual process.”).
36. See, e.g., Kleck & Jackson, supra note 34, at 1578 (“[T]here is some evidence that attitudes
favoring harsher punishment of criminals are affected by the perception—accurate or not—that crime
is increasing.”); Unnever & Cullen, supra note 18, at 110 (explaining “higher crime rate” variable in
study as indicating respondent’s belief that the U.S. crime rate had worsened over previous eight years),
117 (in final regression model, showing that “higher crime rate” was associated with punitive
attitudes); Stack, Cao, & Adamzyck, supra note 18, at 304 (“A multivariate analysis of data from 14
nations . . . finds that the higher the homicide rate, the higher the individual’s support for both [the
death penalty and harsher sentences].”). However, a recent study by Professors Kleck and Jackson
casts doubt on the significance of actual or perceived local (here, county-level) crime rates as
contributors to punitiveness. Kleck and Jackson found no association between a respondent’s
perception that crime in his or her county was high or increasing and the respondent’s preferred
sentence lengths for homicide, robbery, assault, or burglary. Kleck & Jackson, supra note 34, at 1590.
Nor did they find consistent, statistically significant relationships between the county’s actual crime
rates and preferred sentence lengths. Id. “Theoretically,” it has been observed, “one would expect an
association between the crime rate and opinions on criminal justice . . . . [H]igh crime volume is seen
as prompting a practical need for greater social control.” Stack, Cao, & Adamzyck, supra note 18, at
293. In addition to this direct, instrumental connection between crime rates and punitiveness, it has
also been suggested that the relationship may be mediated through social capital. “[H]igh levels of
fear can degrade social trust and promote withdrawal from participation in civic life, two of the
stalwarts of social capital. In turn, levels of social capital are potentially important for explaining
jurisdictional variability in the severity of sanctions applied to law violators.” Baumer & Martin, supra
note 9, at 137 (citations omitted). On the other hand, in considering the importance of crime rates, it
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Some researchers have also identified relationships between punitiveness
and a variety of demographic characteristics, although these relationships have
not necessary been found consistently across the empirical literature.37 Some
of the pertinent characteristics include:
• Education38
• Income39
is important to bear in mind that members of the public may have inaccurate views of crime frequency
and trends. See Adriaenssen & Aertsen, supra note 11, at 98 (summarizing research on public’s lack
of accurate knowledge about crime and the criminal-justice system). Thus, for instance, if high levels
of mass media attention are given to crime, the public may think crime to be getting worse even if it is
dropping. Stack, Cao, & Adamczyk, supra note 18, at 294. But cf. Pickett, supra note 9, at 422 (“[T]he
amount of [traditional media] coverage closely follows the crime rate.”). For this reason, it is possible
that perceived crime rate plays a more important role than actual crime in driving public punitiveness.
Cf. Adriaenssen & Aertsen, supra note 11, at 103 (“High estimations of the prevalence of crime in
society are related to higher levels of punitivity, and vice versa.” (citations omitted)). Not surprisingly,
then, some research suggests that media consumption may play an important role in driving fear of
crime and punitiveness. See Dolliver, Kenney, Williams Reid, & Prohaska, supra note 34, at 414 (“We
found a strong connection between media consumption and fear of crime, and evidence that both
impact support for certain defensive and punitive policies.”); Adriaenssen & Aertsen, supra note 11,
at 103 (“The more hours of television watched, the higher the scores on the punitiveness scale.”
(citations omitted)). It is not clear, however, whether this pattern will hold as people increasingly rely
on Internet news sources in lieu of traditional media. Pickett, supra note 9, at 422.
37. Nor, even when statistically significant relationships are found, do demographic variables
necessarily serve as especially robust predictors of punitiveness. See Adriaenssen & Aertsen, supra
note 11, at 102 (noting that such variables have been found to account for 15% or less of differences
in punitiveness).
38. Some studies find a negative correlation between education level and punitiveness, that is,
individuals with higher levels of education are found to be less punitive. See, e.g., Stack, Cao, &
Adamczyk, supra note 18, at 303 (finding lower education to be statistically significant predictor of
support for stiffer sentences); Unnever & Cullen, supra note 18, at 117 (same). This relationship has
been explained by characterizing education “as a process that questions traditional/conservative beliefs
while strengthening a liberal perspective on crime and other social issues.” Stack, Cao, & Adamczyk,
supra note 18, at 296. While other studies find no relationship between education and punitiveness,
see, e.g., Kleck & Jackson, supra note 34, at 1589, the weight of the extant research supports the notion
that higher education has a “tempering effect on levels of punitivity.” Adriaenssen & Aertsen, supra
note 11, at 101 (citations omitted).
39. See, e.g., Dolliver, Kenney, Williams Reid, & Prohaska, supra note 34, at 414 (finding
statistically significant relationship between income and punitiveness, as well as between income and
fear of crime and media consumption, both of which were also statistically significant predictors of
punitiveness); Unnever, Cullen, & Fisher, supra note 20, at 325 (finding statistically significant
relationship between income and support for both death penalty and harsher local courts). But see
Kleck & Jackson, supra note 34, at 1589 (finding no statistically significant relationship between
income and punitiveness). As an alternative measure of economic status, some studies use full-time
employment in lieu of income level, and also find a statistically significant relationship with
punitiveness. Stack, Cao, & Adamczyk, supra note 18, at 303. It is theorized that individuals who are
employed and satisfied with their financial situation tend to be “more bonded to the social order than
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• Marital status40
• Age41
• Sex42
• Race43
• Urban residence44
We use all of these characteristics as control variables in the current study.45
the unemployed and the financially dissatisfied,” and, in turn, that “[p]ersons with strong bonds to
conventional society” tend to have a particular “stake in the social order” and are more inclined to hold
“conventional beliefs regarding the criminal justice system including the harshness of punishment.”
Id. at 296.
40. See, e.g., Stack, Cao, & Adamczyk, supra note 18, at 303 (finding statistically significant
relationship between marriage and punitiveness). But see Kleck & Jackson, supra note 34, at 1589
(finding no statistically significant relationship). It is theorized that marriage ties individuals to
conventional social institutions and thus enhances support for “law and order” policies. Stack, Cao, &
Adamczyk, supra note 18, at 297.
41. See Adriaenssen & Aertsen, supra note 11, at 101 (“Most of the findings show a positive
relationship between the two variables: younger people tend to be less punitive, compared with older
people. However, some studies have found younger respondents to be more punitive or have found no
relationship.” (citations omitted)). Compare Stack, Cao, & Adamczyk, supra note 18, at 303 (finding
statistically significant relationship between age and punitiveness), with Kleck & Jackson, supra note
34, at 1589 (finding no statistically significant relationship between age and punitiveness).
42. The results of research concerning the impact of gender on punitiveness have been especially
inconsistent and hence difficult to decipher. See Adriaenssen & Aertsen, supra note 11, at 101 (noting
that some studies find men more punitive, some women, and some no statistical significance either
way). Compare Dolliver, Kenney, Williams Reid, & Prohaska, supra note 34, at 412 (finding females
to be more punitive), with Unnever, Cullen, & Fisher, supra note 20, at 325 (finding males to be more
punitive).
43. Several studies find whites to be more punitive than blacks. See Adriaenssen & Aertsen,
supra note 11, at 101 (summarizing research). However, other studies find no statistically significant
relationship between race and punitiveness. Compare Unnever, Cullen, & Fisher, supra note 20, at
325 (finding African-Americans to be less punitive), with Dolliver, Kenney, Williams Reid, &
Prohaska, supra note 34, at 412 (finding no statistically significant relationship between race and
punitiveness).
44. This is not routinely included among demographic control variables, but at least one study
finds urban residence to be positively correlated with punitiveness. Unnever & Cullen, supra note 18,
at 117.
45. One notable variable that we have not utilized is religiosity. Research on the relationship
between punitiveness and religious beliefs and practices has yielded mixed results, Unnever & Cullen,
supra note 18, at 112, but it “has repeatedly been found that traditional Christian fundamentalists are
more punitive overall, compared with other religious people or atheists.” Adriaenssen & Aertsen,
supra note 11, at 102 (citations omitted). Compare Unnever & Cullen, supra note 18, at 117 (finding
statistically significant relationship between multifactor religiosity index and punitiveness), with Stack,
Cao, & Adamczyk, supra note 18, at 303 (finding no statistically significant relationship between
church attendance and punitiveness). See also Unnever, Cullen & Fisher, supra note 20, at 325 (finding
statistically significant relationship between church attendance and punitiveness, but no statistical
significance in relationship between fundamentalism and punitiveness). Some research “points to the
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B. Punitive Attitudes Research in Wisconsin
Since 2012, in collaboration with the Marquette Law School Poll, we have
regularly surveyed Wisconsin voters to determine their attitudes and beliefs
regarding crime and punishment. The Poll is a telephone-based survey
(landline and cell phone) that employs conventional random-digit dialing
techniques.46 While we have covered a wide range of criminal-justice topics in
the Poll, three areas of inquiry have particular relevance for the present Article.
First, we have studied support for truth in sentencing (“TIS”). TIS requires
prisoners to serve most or all of their judge-imposed sentences; early release
mechanisms like parole are either severely restricted or entirely eliminated.47
In some respects, TIS appears similar to other tough-on-crime measures like
“three strikes and you are out” laws that are conventionally classified as
punitive.48 In any event, a large majority (71%) of our respondents endorsed
TIS for Wisconsin. The following associations reached statistical significance:
• Conservatives tended to be more supportive of TIS
• Men tended to be less supportive of TIS
• Whites tended to be less supportive of TIS
• Residents of Milwaukee, Wisconsin’s largest urban area,
tended to be less supportive49

tendency for religious fundamentalists to hold a negative view of human nature, which in turn leads to
support for rigid adherence to the law and a concomitant emphasis on extreme punishment as a method
of crime control.” Baumer & Martin, supra note 9, at 139 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). On the other hand, “simple comparisons for punishment attitudes among persons who adhere
to different religions (e.g., fundamentalists vs. others) may confound conclusions because some
features of Christian fundamentalist beliefs (e.g., having a harsh hierarchical image of God) are
associated with heightened punitiveness while others (e.g., compassion) are linked to lower levels of
punitiveness.” Id. at 140.
Perhaps related to certain forms of religiosity, a few studies find a relationship between
punitiveness and belief in a just world, that is, the “belief that good things will happen to good people
and bad things will happen to bad people.” Adriaenssen & Aertsen, supra note 11, at 102.
46. For background on the administration of the Marquette Law School Poll, see O’Hear &
Wheelock, supra note 10, at 274–75.
47. Id. at 258, 264.
48. Id. at 259 n.12. On the other hand, we have hypothesized that TIS may not be only about
increasing severity, but may also reflect a desire to enhance the legitimacy of the criminal-justice
system by providing greater transparency regarding the practical significance of sentences and by
shifting power from an unelected parole board to elected judges. Id. at 266–67.
49. Id. at 281–82.
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On the other hand, we found no association between support for TIS and
fear of crime, and mixed results as to our three measures of neighborhood
cohesion, only one of which was a significant correlate of TIS support.50
Second, we have studied support for flexibility with prison release dates.
In principle, early release would seem to be the opposite of TIS. One would
expect support for one to imply opposition to the other, and vice versa.
Surprisingly, though, we found evidence of strong majority support for early
release, just as we had for TIS. As to one version of the question, 55% of
respondents agreed that “[o]nce a prisoner has served at least half of his term,
he should be released from prison and given a less costly form of punishment
if he can demonstrate that he is no longer a threat to society.”51 In another
version, we raised the minimum that had to be served from one-half to twothirds of the prison term, and we found an even higher level of support—66%.52
The results of our models show the following trends:
• Married people tended to be less supportive of early
release.
50. Id. at 282. We did, however, find a statistically significant correlation between TIS support
and support for the idea that judges should have power over sentences, instead of a statewide sentencing
commission. Id. This finding provides some support for the legitimacy view of TIS, as described
above in note 48.
51. Id. at 288.
52. Id. at 289. We report here results from 2012 (halfway release) and 2014 (two-thirds release).
More recently, in July 2018, we replicated the results for two-thirds release, finding once again that
66% of respondents agreed with early release. MARQUETTE UNIV. LAW SCH. POLL, MARQUETTE LAW
SCHOOL POLL: JULY 11 – JULY 15, 2018, at 10 (2018), https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wpcontent/uploads/2020/04/MLSP46Toplines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P4B6-CMB7]
[hereinafter
Toplines]. However, just six months later, in January 2019 our colleagues at the Marquette Law School
repeated our early release questions and came up with somewhat different results. They found that
only 42% supported halfway release, and only 51% supported two-thirds release. MARQUETTE UNIV.
LAW SCH. POLL, MARQUETTE LAW SCHOOL POLL: JAN. 16–20, 2019, at 6, 7 (2019),
https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/MLSP51Toplines.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FKX9-JU2V]. After we found no indications of change between 2014 and 2018, it
seems unlikely that there was such a sharp shift in public opinion over the six months between July
2018 and January 2019. In our view, the different outcomes likely result in part from a difference in
the way that potential answers were structured. In our version, we gave respondents the options of
strongly agree, agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree; the first
three answers were coded as “agree,” while the latter three were coded as “disagree.” By contrast, in
the January 2019 administration, there was no “somewhat agree” or “somewhat disagree” options,
which effectively forced respondents to take a stronger position on the issue or say “don’t know.” Not
surprisingly, the “don’t know” percentage was considerably higher in January 2019 (13% as to twothirds release) than in July 2018 (5%). Since there were many more “somewhat agree” than “somewhat
disagree” responses in July 2018, respondents’ inability to similarly express weak support for (or
opposition to) early release in January 2019 likely had a bigger impact on the overall agree percent
than it did on the overall disagree percent.
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Conservatives tended to be less supportive of early release
Men tended to be more supportive of early release.
Residents of Milwaukee tended to be more supportive of
early release.53
However, we found no statistically significant association between early
release support and either fear of crime or neighborhood cohesion.54
It is not clear how to interpret the apparent inconsistency in our findings of
strong majority support for both TIS and early release. Similar inconsistencies
have also been noted in the national research, which has consistently found both
overwhelming support for offender rehabilitation and alternatives to
incarceration and similarly strong support for tougher sentencing.55 On the one
hand, such seemingly inconsistent views may be seen as an indication of
American pragmatism, understood here as a resistance to broad, inflexible,
ideologically driven policies, and a preference for flexible, context-sensitive
policies that seek to balance competing social values. On the other hand, there
are reasons to think that the apparent inconsistencies may simply result from
methodological flaws or weaknesses in conventional survey techniques.56
Third, and finally, we have studied support for offender rehabilitation. A
large majority (74%) of our respondents agreed that “rehabilitating offenders
and helping them to become contributing members of society” was either
“absolutely essential” or at least a “very important” priority for the criminaljustice system.57 In our final multiple regression model, we found that
conservatives were less likely to support rehabilitation, as well as individuals
•
•
•

53. O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10, at 290.
54. Id. However, as with TIS, we did find a correlation between early release support and a
preference for judges over sentencing commissions.
55. O’HEAR, PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 2, at 209.
56. Inconsistencies may result, for instance, from acquiescence bias. See supra note 12. In our
Wisconsin research, we have examined more closely the “swing voters” who support both TIS and
early release. Our analysis pointed to a number of ways in which the swing voters differed from the
consistent TIS supporters (i.e., those who support TIS and opposed early release): less likely to be
married, less likely to be white, less likely to be conservative, more likely to live in Milwaukee, more
likely to think that rehabilitative progress should be taken into account in release decisions, and more
likely to think that imprisonment should be subject to cost-benefit balancing. O’Hear & Wheelock,
supra note 10, at 296–98. Meanwhile, in comparison with the consistent TIS opponents (i.e., those
who oppose TIS and favor early release), the swing voters are older, more religious, less educated,
more conservative, and more punitive. Id. at 299–300.
57. Michael M. O’Hear & Darren Wheelock, Public Attitudes Toward Punishment,
Rehabilitation, and Reform: Lessons from the Marquette Law School Poll, 29 FED. SENT’G. RPTR. 47,
48 (2016).
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who scored high on the “modern racism” measure.58 (Our earlier surveys on
TIS and early release had not included questions on racial attitudes.) However,
we found no statistically significant association between rehabilitation support
and exposure to crime or the criminal-justice system.59
Tying together our Wisconsin research on public support for TIS, early
release, and rehabilitation with the national research on punitiveness, a few
notable themes have emerged:
• Political conservatism consistently corresponds with
staunch support for severe criminal-justice polices.
• Racial resentment (modern racism) also covaries with
greater levels of punitiveness.
• Results are inconsistent when it comes to perceptions of
community or societal cohesion and the desire to punish.
• Fear and personal experience with criminal victimization
are not consistently associated with policy preferences.
• Standard demographic variables (education, income,
marital status, religiosity, age, sex, race, and urban
residence) are not consistently associated with policy
preferences.
C. Prior Research on Attitudes Toward Violent Crime
In contrast to the voluminous research on punitiveness in general, there has
been comparatively little academic work on attitudes toward violent crime in
particular. However, a number of surveys do indicate that the public holds more
punitive views toward violent than nonviolent crime.60 For instance, in 2006,

58. Id. at 51. Surprisingly, when conservatism and racial attitudes were held constant,
Republicans were actually more likely than others to support rehabilitation. Id.
59. Exposure was assessed by asking respondents whether they had a family member who had
either been a crime victim or a criminal defendant. Id.
60. Another related line of research suggests that individuals who have been convicted of violent
offenses face particularly high social stigma and barriers to employment. See Jessica A. Cerda,
Douglas M. Stenstrom, & Mathew Curtis, The Role of Type of Offense and Work Qualifications on
Perceived Employability of Former Offenders, 40 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 317, 318 (2015) (summarizing
research). For instance, in one recent study using a nationally representative sample, respondents
perceived a higher recidivism risk among offenders convicted of violent than nonviolent offenses.
Megan Denver, Justin T. Pickett & Shawn D. Bushway, The Language of Stigmatization and the Mark
of Violence: Experimental Evidence on the Social Construction and Use of Criminal Record Stigma,
55 CRIMINOLOGY 664, 675–76 (2017). Not surprisingly, then, respondents were more supportive of
denying employment on the basis of violent than nonviolent convictions. Id. at 677.
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a survey commissioned by the National Center for State Courts61 included the
following findings:
• 65% of respondents said that sentences for violent crimes
are too lenient, as opposed to only 39% for property and
drug crimes.62
• 73% supported mandatory sentences for violent crime, as
opposed to only 42% for property crime and 40% for drug
crime.63
• 51% said that alternatives to prison should never be used
in cases of violent crime, as opposed to only 10% for
property and drug crime.64
• 72% said that it was “very important” to do more to keep
violent offenders in prison longer.65
Although the authors of the NCSC report offered a few intriguing
findings,66 their study lacked more sophisticated and nuanced analysis.67
D. Prior Research on Importance of Question Framing
Research on criminal-justice attitudes indicates that the framing of
questions sometimes matters a great deal—overall support for a policy may
vary considerably depending on how the policy is explained or

61. PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCS. INT’L, THE NCSC SENTENCING ATTITUDES
SURVEY: A REPORT ON THE FINDINGS (2006).
62. Id. at 26.
63. Id. at 29.
64. Id. at 31.
65. Id. at 38.
66. On the question of whether the courts were too lenient in sentencing violent crime, higher
levels of V-punitiveness were evident among the less well-informed, Republicans, and whites. Id. at
26–27. The racial dimension to V-punitiveness found in the NCSC survey may be related to the
tendency of Americans to rate blacks as more violence-prone than whites and to overestimate the share
of violent crime that is perpetrated by blacks. See GHANDNOOSH, supra note 23, at 13–14
(summarizing research).
67. Perhaps the study that is closest to ours in this respect was conducted by Professors Kleck
and Jackson, whose survey of a nationally representative sample included questions about preferred
sentence length for four different crimes: murder (median response = 476 months), robbery (147
months), assault (142 months), and burglary (106 months). Kleck & Jackson, supra note 34, at 1585.
Kleck and Jackson then tried to determine whether these preferred sentence lengths were correlated
with exposure to crime or any of a standard set of demographic variables. No variable was a
statistically significant predictor of punitiveness with respect to all four crimes. Id. at 1587–89. The
only variables that predicted punitiveness as to even three of the crimes were (1) frequent watching of
local news and (2) percent Republican in the respondent’s county. Id. Each crime had its own unique
set of punitiveness predictors. Id.
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contextualized.68 For instance, general questions (“Do you support mandatory
minimum prison sentences for violent offenders?”) tend to produce more
punitive responses than more specific questions (“Do you support a mandatory
minimum prison sentence for a person with X characteristics who committed
the crime of Y?”).69 Additionally, providing respondents with accurate
information about crime rates and punishment also tends to reduce
punitiveness.70 Some research suggests that feelings about punishment derive
from the dynamic interplay between snap emotional responses to harm and
more “top-down rational, cognitive processes.”71 It seems possible that
different ways of framing survey questions may tend to activate the rational
processes more powerfully than others, potentially leading to different
responses to questions.
III. HYPOTHESES
Based on the research discussed above, we offer the following hypotheses
as to “V-PUNITIVE,” our measure of punitiveness toward violent crime.72
Hypothesis 1: Politically conservative respondents tend to manifest
greater levels of V-PUNITIVE.
Conservatism has proven a consistently effective predictor of general
punitiveness in the national research and has also figured prominently in our
prior Wisconsin work.73
Hypothesis 2: Respondents who express higher levels of racial
resentment tend to manifest higher levels of V-PUNITIVE.
Racial resentment (modern racism) has also been found to be a predictor of
criminal-justice attitudes in national studies and in some of our prior Wisconsin
research.74

68. See Pickett, supra note 9, at 407 (summarizing research).
69. See id.
70. See id. at 408 (summarizing research).
71. Mark R. Fondacaro & Megan J. O’Toole, American Punitiveness and Mass Incarceration:
Psychological Perspectives on Retributive and Consequentialist Responses to Crime, NEW. CRIM. L.
REV. 477, 482 (2015).
72. The components of V-PUNITIVE are detailed in Part IV below.
73. See Unnever & Cullen, supra note 18, at 115.
74. See Unnever, Cullen & Fisher, supra note 20, at 315.
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Hypothesis 3: Respondents who exhibit greater authoritarianism tend
to manifest higher levels of V-PUNITIVE.
Authoritarianism has been associated with general punitiveness on the
national level, although we have not previously included authoritarianism in
our Wisconsin studies.75
Hypothesis 4: Respondents who describe their “neighborhood” as
having low levels of collective efficacy tend to manifest higher levels of VPUNITIVE.
The sociological term “collective efficacy” has been defined succinctly as
“social cohesion combined with shared expectations for social control.”76 As
noted above, some research suggests that punitiveness is associated with
perceptions that social cohesion is fraying, although we have found at best
mixed results when testing this proposition in our earlier Wisconsin work.77 For
purposes of this paper, we have modified our questions to get more directly at
the related construct of collective efficacy, which involves trust that one’s
neighbors will act to address shared neighborhood problems.78 Intuitively, it
seems plausible that individuals who do not perceive there to be effective
mechanisms of informal social control in their communities will desire more
vigorous formal social control from the criminal-justice system.
Hypothesis 5: Framing questions by providing specific illustrations of
violent crime reduces V-PUNITIVE.
Some research indicates that greater specificity in questions reduces
punitiveness.79 Based on this, we hypothesize that respondents will be more
punitive when asked about punishment for “violent crimes” in a general way
than when specific illustrations of violent crime are utilized. We suspect that,
when asked about “violent crimes,” respondents may tend to answer based on
the worst sorts of violent crime that seem to spring to mind when the phrase is
encountered, such as murder, and we think it possible that this tendency may
be diminished if respondents are encouraged instead to think about less
extreme, more common forms of criminal violence.

75. See infra Section IV.C.
76. ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING
NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 27 (2012).
77. See supra Section II.B.
78. SAMPSON, supra note 76, at 156.
79. See Pickett, supra note 9, at 407 (summarizing research).
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Hypothesis 6: Punitiveness toward violent crime exceeds punitiveness
toward property crime.
Several national surveys have found more punitive attitudes toward violent
crime than nonviolent property crime.80 We hypothesize that Wisconsin voters
will also exhibit greater V-punitiveness than “P-punitiveness.”
IV. METHODOLOGY
Our data derive from the administration of the Marquette University Law
School Poll on July 11–15, 2018.81 Interviewed by cellphone and landline, our
respondents numbered 800 registered Wisconsin voters, giving us a margin of
error of +/– 4.1 percentage points.82 Responses were weighted to compensate
for the under-representation of some demographic groups in our sample.83
Table 1 sets forth basic demographic and other information regarding the
sample, as well as the average (mean) response to our criminal justice
questions.84

80. See supra Section II.C.
81. LHK Partners Inc. managed the data collection, with telephone interviews conducted by SHC
Universal. MARQUETTE UNIV. LAW SCH. POLL, METHODOLOGY: MARQUETTE LAW SCHOOL POLL,
JULY
11–15,
2018,
at
1
(2018),
https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/MLSP46Methodology.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC78-ANMV].
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. For topline results for all questions, see Toplines, supra note 52.
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TABLE 1: SUMMARY OF DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES FOR TOTAL SAMPLE
Variable

Freq/N

%

Male

412

51.5

Female

388

48.5

800

49.9

Less than college

413

52.0

College or greater

382

48.1

White

674

86.6

Other

104

13.4

Yes

21

2.7

No

763

97.3

Very conservative

69

8.6

Conservative

231

28.9

Moderate

245

30.6

Liberal

151

18.9

Very liberal

61

7.6

Live in Milwaukee County

116

14.6

Do not live in Milwaukee County

677

85.4

Yes

163

20.8

No

622

79.2

Yes

57

7.3

No

729

92.8

Strongly Agree

369

46.9

Agree

252

32

Somewhat Agree

65

8.3

Somewhat Disagree

30

3.8

Disagree

44

5.6

Strongly Disagree

27

3.4

Sex

Age (Mean Years)
Education

Race

Hispanic

Political Orientation

Milwaukee County

Violent Crime Victim

Property Crime Victim

I Feel Safe Walking Around Neighborhood
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Freq/N

%

Strongly Agree

33

4.1

Agree

33

4.1

Violent Crime a Major Problem

Somewhat Agree

70

8.8

Somewhat Disagree

117

14.6

Disagree

292

36.5

Strongly Disagree

247

30.9

40

5.1

Property Crime a Major Problem
Strongly Agree
Agree

42

5.3

Somewhat Agree

116

14.7

Somewhat Disagree

86

10.9

Disagree

311

39.5

Strongly Disagree

193

24.5

Strongly Agree

282

36.4

Agree

283

36.5

Somewhat Agree

109

14.1

Somewhat Disagree

38

4.9

Disagree

41

5.3

Strongly Disagree

22

2.8

Strongly Agree

179

24

Agree

249

33.3

Somewhat Agree

175

23.4

Somewhat Disagree

56

7.5

Disagree

63

8.4

Strongly Disagree

25

3.4

One Right Way

Free Thinkers

Old Ways Are Best
Strongly Agree

46

6

Agree

113

14.8

Somewhat Agree

80

10.5

Somewhat Disagree

170

22.3

Disagree

182

23.9

Strongly Disagree

172

22.5
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Freq/N

%

Library Closing
Very Likely

412

54

Somewhat Likely

236

30.9

Unlikely

71

9.3

Very Unlikely

44

5.8

Very Likely

327

44.1

Somewhat Likely

240

32.4

Unlikely

119

16.1

Very Unlikely

55

7.4

Very Likely

383

51.3

Somewhat Likely

225

30.1

Unlikely

93

12.5

Very Unlikely

46

6.2

Racial resentment (Mean, standard deviation)

646

9.38 (.17)

Homicide Rate (Mean)

793

3.15 (.20)

Violent Crime Rate (Mean)

793

310.34 (14.43)

Property Crime Rate (Mean)

793

1767.82 (30.73)

Percent Nonwhite (Mean)

793

12.10 (.46)

Poverty Rate (Mean)

793

16.18 (.24)

Unemployment Rate (Mean)

793

4.72 (.07)

1 Year Change in Homicide (Mean)

793

-.73 (.10)

1 Year Change in Violent Crime (Mean)

793

21.99 (2.28)

1 Year Change in Property Crime (Mean)

793

-125.32 (7.16)

1 Year Change in Percent Nonwhite (Mean)

793

.19 (.006)

1 Year Change in Poverty (Mean)

793

.06 (.12)

1 Year Change in Unemployment (Mean)

793

-.80 (.016)

Violent Crime Punitiveness Index

703

11.22 (.15)

Property Crime Punitiveness Index

678

10.5 (.15)

Kids Hanging Out

Fighting Outside
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Our primary dependent variable is an index (V-PUNITIVE) based on
responses to three questions that elicited agreement or disagreement with these
propositions:
• In general, the courts are too lenient with individuals who
are convicted of violent crimes.
• Individuals who have been convicted of a violent crime
should normally be sentenced to prison, even if it is a firsttime offense.
• Anyone who has been convicted of two or more violent
crimes should have to spend the rest of his or her life in
prison, with no exceptions.85
Analysis suggests that these three items measure a similar underlying
concept (alpha = .60).
In asking about these propositions, we employed a split-sample research
design in which respondents were randomly assigned to one of two subsamples.
In order to test for possible framing effects, the respondents in sample A were
given specific examples of violent offenses, while the respondents in sample B
were not provided with any such illustrations.86 For the most part we did not
observe statistically significant differences in responses between the two
subsamples.87 We approached the analysis with care when we merged the
subsamples and replicated each model with separate analysis for each
subsample to detect whether the results were consistent.
Although V-PUNITIVE is our primary focus, we also performed an
additional set of analyses focusing on punitiveness toward property crime (PPUNITIVE). This variable was also based on agreement or disagreement with
three propositions. The first two simply repeated the first two statements used
for V-PUNITIVE, but with “property” substituted for “violent.”88 The third
proposition was modified to a greater extent, as follows: “Anyone who has been
85. MARQUETTE UNIV. LAW SCH. POLL, MARQUETTE LAW SCHOOL POLL – JULY 11–15, 2018,
at
Q46–48
(2018),
https://law.marquette.edu/poll/wpcontent/uploads/2018/07/MLSP46Instrument.pdf [https://perma.cc/RC78-ANMV].
86. Both groups were told, “The next few questions are about violent crime. By violent crime,
I mean crimes in which the perpetrator physically injures or threatens to physically injure the victim.”
Id., preface to Q45–49. However, the respondents in sample A received this further instruction: “Some
examples of violent crime include: Forcible sexual assault[;] Physical abuse within a marital
relationship[;] Armed robbery of a convenience store.” Id. The order of the specific offenses was
scrambled at random.
87. The exceptions are that respondents in subsample A were more likely to agree with the
statements that there is no one right way to live, that property crime is a major problem where the
respondent lives, and that violent crime is a major problem where the respondent lives.
88. Id. at Q51–52.
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convicted of two or more property crimes should have to spend at least one year
in prison, with no exceptions.”89 Reliability analysis indicates that the PPUNITIVE items measure a similar underlying concept (alpha = .68). We also
employed a split-sample design with the P-PUNITIVE questions.90
Our independent variables include standard demographic characteristics:
racial views,91 authoritarianism,92 collective efficacy,93 recent victimization,94
and fear and perceived risk of future victimization.95 The models also include
89. Id. at Q53.
90. Each subsample was told, “The next few questions are about property crime. By property
crime, I mean crimes in which the perpetrator enters, takes, or damages the property of another person
without permission, but does not physically injure or threaten to physically injure the victim.” Id.,
preface to Q50–54. However, the respondents in sample A received this further instruction: “Some
examples of property crime include: Shoplifting[;] A person breaking into a garage at night looking
for something to steal[;] An investment scam that targets the elderly.” Id. The order of the specific
offenses was also scrambled at random.
91. For this variable, we used an index derived from responses to three of the standard “modern
racism” questions (alpha = .75). Id. at Q35–38.
92. We elicited agreement or disagreement with three statement that are conventionally used as
measures of authoritarianism:
•
There is no “one right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own
way.
•
Our country needs free thinkers who will have the courage to defy
traditional ways, even if this upsets many people.
•
The “old-fashioned ways” and “old-fashioned values” still show the best
way to live.
Id. at Q38–40; Bob Altemeyer, The RWA Scale, http://www.panojohnson.com/automatons/rwascale.xhtml (last updated Nov. 25, 2018) [https://perma.cc/MG67-97S3]. In the present study, the three
questions did not load into a single index, so we use each as a separate independent variable.
93. In order to assess respondents’ sense of collective efficacy in their neighborhoods, we used
the following questions:
•
Suppose that because of budget cuts the library closest to your home was
going to be closed down. How likely is it that neighborhood residents would
organize to try to do something to keep the library open?
•
If a group of neighborhood children were skipping school and hanging out,
how likely is it that your neighbors would do something about it?
•
If there was a fight in front of your house and someone was being beaten or
threatened, how likely is it that your neighbors would break it up?
MARQUETTE UNIV. LAW SCH. POLL, supra note 85, at Q42–44. These questions are based on a similar
battery of questions utilized by Robert Sampson to assess collective efficacy. See SAMPSON, supra
note 76, at 156. In the present study, the three questions did not load into a single index, so we use
each as a separate independent variable.
94. More specifically, we asked, “Has anyone in your household or a close neighbor of yours
been a victim of violent crime in the past year or so?” MARQUETTE UNIV. LAW SCH. POLL, supra note
85, at Q49. We also asked an analogous question about property crime. Id. at Q54.
95. More specifically, we elicited agreement or disagreement with the following statements:
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several county-level measures to capture crime rates and trends, economic
distress, and racial and ethnic demographics.
We specify two models for both V-PUNITIVE and P-PUNITIVE. Both
models include all the individual-level covariates, but each model contains only
a portion of the aggregate (county-level) measures. More specifically, Model
1 contains the crime indicators, while Model 2 contains the economic and
demographic indicators. We have divided these aggregate measures in order to
address multicollinearity. Most of Wisconsin’s nonwhite population is
concentrated in just a few counties located in the Southeast portion of the state,
which tend to be the same counties that have the highest concentrations of
inequality and crime.96 The close relationship between these variables creates
problems with analysis when they are included in a single model. By using two
models, we are able to observe the unique impact of the various aggregate
county measures in explaining variation across V-PUNITIVE and PPUNITIVE.97
V. RESULTS
A. Regression Models
Table 2 sets forth our regression models for V-PUNITIVE, and Table 3 for
P-PUNITIVE.98 The coefficient for each independent variable (“B”) can be
•
I feel safe walking alone at night around my neighborhood.
•
Violent crime is a major problem in the area where I live.
•
Property crime is a major problem in the area where I live.
Id. at Q41, Q45, Q50.
96. See
QuickFacts,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/kenoshacountywisconsin,racinecountywisconsin,milwa
ukeecountywisconsin,WI,US/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/7SKA-K4UD] (using census data to
compare Milwaukee, Racine, and Kenosha county’s nonwhite population to Wisconsin’s total
nonwhite population).
97. In light of the multicollinearity problem, we have also combined African-American and
Hispanic/Latinx populations into a single “Nonwhite” group.
98. Since individuals are nested within counties in our data structure, the use of Ordinary Least
Squares regression with our data is potentially problematic. On average, there were 11.3 respondents
per county (with a minimum value of one and a maximum value of 116 respondents). The potential
for correlated errors is substantial with multilevel data so we corrected for the potential deflation of
standard errors by estimating random effects models. While typically utilized for longitudinal panel
data, numerous researchers have also employed random effects and other HLM procedures for crosssectional data where cases nest in aggregate units. See, e.g., Ian Brunton-Smith, Patrick Sturgis, &
George Leckie, How Collective Is Collective Efficacy? The Importance of Consensus in Judgments
About Community Cohesion and Willingness to Intervene, 56 CRIMINOLOGY 608, 617 (2018); Darren
Wheelock, Meghan Stroshine, & Michael O’Hear, Disentangling the Relationship Between Race and

OHEAR_WHEELOCK_12MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

5/14/2020 4:45 PM

1061

VIOLENT CRIME AND PUNITIVENESS

interpreted as the amount that changes in the dependent variable for a one-unit
increase in the independent variable.99
TABLE 2: RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS WITH V-PUNITIVE
Variable

Model 1
B

Model 2

Stand Error

B

Stand Error

Demographic measures
Men

-.75**

.26

-.74**

.26

Age

.005

.008

.005

.008

White

-.021

.38

-.040

.37

Hispanic

-1.13

.76

-1.08

.76

College degree

♦

-.43

.24

♦

-.46

.24

Political orientation

.48**

.15

.47**

.15

Fear of crime

-.04

.11

-.05

.11

Violent crime a problem

♦

.20

.11

♦

.20

.11

Property crime is a problem

.22*

.10

.23*

.10

Victim of violent

-.34

.31

-.40

.31

Victim of property

-.32

.49

-.32

.50

Library closing

-.10

.15

-.091

.15

Kids hanging out

.088

.14

.10

.14

Fight outside

.21

.14

.21

.15

-.075

.096

-.074

.096

Crime related

Collective Efficacy

Authoritarianism
One right way
Free thinkers

.029

.10

.021

.10

Old ways best

.55***

.094

.57***

.094

Racial resentment

.10*

.045

.10*

.045

Aggregate measures

Attitudes Toward the Police: Police Contact, Perceptions of Safety, and Procedural Justice, 65 CRIME
& DELINQ. 941, 950–51 (2019). A random effects model contains properties useful for the present
data because it accounts for the error structure better than OLS regression. Random effects models
include an error term with two components. One component represents the traditional error term
unique to each observation and a second error term represents the difference between the crosssectional units (counties in our data) and the intercept. LOIS W. SAYRS, POOLED TIME SERIES
ANALYSIS 32–51 (1989). The random effects model thus better accounts for within and across unit
error relative to the basic OLS models.
99. The tables also include standard errors, which indicate the accuracy of a sample estimate
based on sample characteristics including the standard deviation and the sample size.
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Model 2

Model 1

Variable

B

Stand Error

Homicide rate

.047

.084

Violent crime rate

.001

.002

Property crime rate

-.0003

.0003

.02

.072

Violent rate change

.0002

.003

Property crime change

.00001

.001

Homicide rate change

Percent nonwhite

B

Stand Error

.036*

.015

-.86

.67

Percent nonwhite change
Unemployment rate

.025

.14

Poverty rate

-.047

.035

Unemployment change

-.055

.33

.04

.044

5.67***

1.07

Poverty change
Constant

5.43***

N

1.17

800

800

♦ p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

TABLE 3: RANDOM EFFECTS MODEL WITH P-PUNITIVE
Variable

Model 1

Model 2

B

Stand Error

B

Stand Error

Men

-.17

.25

-.16

.25

Age

.018*

.007

.018*

.007

-.41

.37

-.38

.37

Hispanic

.69

.75

.61

.75

College degree

-.19

.24

-.17

.24

.51**

.16

.52**

.16

Fear of crime

.048

.11

.054

.11

Violent crime a problem

.05

.11

.038

.11

Demographic measures

White

Political orientation
Crime related

Property crime is a problem

.46***

.11

.47***

.11

Victim of violent

-.21

.33

-.21

.32

Victim of property

.22

.47

.23

.46

Library closing

-.14

.15

-.14

.15

Kids hanging out

.28*

.13

.30*

.15

Fight outside

-.11

.14

-.11

.15

Collective Efficacy
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Model 1

Variable

Model 2

B

Stand Error

B

Stand Error

-.10

.094

-.11

.093

Authoritarianism
One right way
Free thinkers

-.02

.09

-.027

.089

Old ways best

.54***

.091

.54***

.089

Racial resentment

.13**

.043

.13**

.042

Percent nonwhite

.016

.017

Percent nonwhite
change

.25

.75

Unemployment rate

.20

.15

Poverty rate

-.034

.041

Unemployment change

.70*

.35

Aggregate measures
Homicide rate

.10

.083

Violent crime rate

-.0003

.002

Property crime rate

-.0002

.0004

Homicide rate change

-.093

.072

Violent rate change

.0002

.002

Property crime change

.0006

.001

Poverty change
Constant
N

3.90**

1.14

.017

.05

3.60**

1.12

800

800

♦ p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

It is important to note that we faced issues with missing values. In the final
models, we would have lost 343 cases due to listwise deletion.100 Otherwise
stated, we would have been utilizing 57% of the sample. We adopted the
multiple imputation technique to address the missing values problem with
STATA SE 14.101 Multiple imputation yielded a sample of 800 respondents for
our final models.

100. Listwise deletion is one method of handling missing cases by removing the entire case when
there is missing value on any variable included in the analysis.
101. For a description of this technique, see STATA CORP., STATA MULTIPLE-IMPUTATION
REFERENCE MANUAL RELEASE 13, at 3–6 (2013).
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B. General Observations
Several noteworthy patterns emerged in the regression models.102 The
results indicate that two demographic background factors are statistically
significant predictors of the V-PUNITIVE dependent measure. More
specifically, in all the models, politically conservative respondents tend to
manifest higher levels of V-PUNITIVE than respondents who identify as
politically liberal, while male respondents tend to manifest lower levels of VPUNITIVE than female respondents. As noted above, many of the prior studies
on punitiveness have also found a relationship between conservatism and
punitiveness, but they have reached inconsistent conclusions concerning gender
effects.103
Also consistent with some prior research, fear of crime and past experiences
of criminal victimization are non-significant in all of our models. On the other
hand, we do find an association between V-PUNITIVE and the perception that
violent crime is a “major problem” where the respondent lives,104 and similarly
with the perception that property crime is a “major problem.”105
102. We report the results of select models that produced the most consistent results, but we ran
several others with different combinations of the aggregate measures. As previously discussed,
multicollinearity was frequently an issue as economic inequality and minority populations in
Wisconsin are intensely concentrated. For the results of these additional analyses please contact the
authors.
103. See supra Part II.A. Our findings suggest that the existence and direction of gender on
punitiveness may partly depend on the type of crime at issue. While we found men to be less punitive
toward violent crime, we did not find a statistically significant difference between the sexes when it
came to P-PUNITIVE. The results may not be surprising given the much greater tendency of men to
perpetrate violent crime, O’HEAR, PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 2, at 130, which may
suggest a higher level of male acceptance of violence. By contrast, there is somewhat less disparity in
male and female rates of property offending, id., which may help to explain why sex did not seem
particularly associated with P-PUNITIVE.
104. At first blush, it may seem that the “major problem” question is essentially duplicative of
our fear question (whether the respondent feels safe walking alone at night in his or her neighborhood).
However, there may be subtle differences between feeling fear and intellectually evaluating crime
levels. Cf. Dolliver, Kenney, Williams Reid & Prohaska, supra note 34, at 406 (“Fear of crime is
considered more emotionally driven, whereas perception of risk is more of an intellectual process.”).
Additionally, while the fear question focuses attention on public spaces in the respondent’s
neighborhood, the view that violent crime is a major problem may also be based on perceptions of
violence in private spaces, e.g., domestic violence. Finally, we note that our contrasting findings as to
the two questions may to some extent reflect the impact of acquiescence bias, see supra note 12, insofar
as acquiescent answers to the fear and “major problem” questions would point in opposite directions
(no to fear and yes to major problem).
105. It is not immediately clear what would account for a relationship between perceived levels
of property crime and preferred policies toward violent crime. It seems plausible that sentiments
towards violent offenses are so salient that understandings of any crime as a problem—violent or
property—can lead to elevated levels of punitiveness.
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Focusing on the county-level measures, we find that none of the aggregate
crime measures shares a significant relationship with V-PUNITIVE, net of the
other factors in the model. This is consistent with previous results that fail to
uncover a connection between punitiveness and fear of crime or previous
experiences with victimization. Similarly, none of the demographic or
economic aggregate measures explain variation across V-PUNITIVE with one
lone notable exception: respondents who reside in counties with greater
concentrations of nonwhite residents are more likely to manifest higher levels
of V-PUNITIVE. The results of Model 2 in Table 2 show an average increase
of .036% in V-PUNITIVE when the nonwhite share of the population increases
across counties by 1%.
The P-PUNITIVE models share strong similarities to the V-PUNITIVE
models, but also a few notable differences. As to the demographic background
covariates, gender is no longer correlated with punitiveness, but political
orientation continues to be an important explanatory factor. As with the VPUNITIVE index, respondents who identify as politically conservative tend to
manifest more punitive beliefs than do political liberals toward individuals
convicted of property offenses. In the P-PUNITIVE models we also observed
college-educated respondents reporting lower levels of punitiveness than the
non-college-educated. The crime-related perceptual measures also shift. The
extent to which violence is viewed as a problem is no longer significant in either
P-PUNITIVE model, but the extent to which property crime is viewed as a
problem is significant in both models. More specifically, respondents who view
property crime as a problem in their community tend to hold more punitive
beliefs regarding property crime.
We also find the racial resentment index to be a significant predictor of PPUNITIVE, but reach more mixed results as to our measures of collective
efficacy and authoritarianism.106 As will be detailed in the next Section, these
findings closely, but not exactly, mirror our V-PUNITIVE findings.
Turning to the aggregate measures, we again find a high degree of similarity
with the V-PUNITIVE results: almost none of the county-level variables
achieve significance in Table 3. Indeed, as with V-PUNITIVE, we find only
one statistically significant correlation. Here, that correlation is with change in
the county unemployment rate. Model 2 in Table 3 shows an average increase
106. P-PUNITIVE correlated with only one of our three measures of collective efficacy,
specifically, whether the respondent thought that his or her neighbors would do something to address
a problem with kids skipping school and hanging out. See supra note 93. Similarly, P-PUNITIVE
was correlated with only one of our three measures of authoritarianism, specifically, whether the
respondent agrees that the “‘old-fashioned ways’ and “old-fashioned values” still show the best way
to live.” See supra note 92.
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of P-PUNITIVE of 0.7% when the change in the unemployment rate increases
across counties by 1%. We find it interesting that V-PUNITIVE is linked to
the racial and ethnic demographic composition of a county, yet P-PUNITIVE
is tied to economic conditions.107 This final contrast further underscores that
while V-PUNITIVE and P-PUNITIVE may be closely related phenomena in
many respects, they do not appear to be grounded in an entirely identical set of
perceptions, concerns, and values. This suggests the need for caution in
generalizing from findings about punitiveness across crime types.108
Other notable findings are discussed below in relation to our hypotheses
from Part III.
C. Analysis of Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Politically conservative respondents tend to manifest
greater levels of V-PUNITIVE.
Consistent with much prior research, we found that conservatives tended
to be more punitive in their policy preferences. Indeed, this held across both
models as to both V- and P-PUNITIVE.
Hypothesis 2: Respondents who express higher levels of racial
resentment tend to manifest higher levels of V-PUNITIVE.
Once again, our results were as expected. We found an association between
racial resentment and V- and P-PUNITIVE in both models. We also found
evidence of a possibly related phenomenon insofar as residents of counties with
higher nonwhite populations also tended to manifest higher levels of VPUNITIVE.109
Hypothesis 3: Respondents who exhibit greater authoritarianism tend
to manifest higher levels of V-PUNITIVE.
Hypothesis 3 presents a difficulty: we attempted to assess authoritarianism
based on responses to three questions, but the three did not load well into a
single index (alpha = .367). This result, which suggests that the three questions
107. It is possible that this contrast partly reflects particular associations that many people seem
to make between African-Americans and violence. See ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS 10–11 (2016) (discussing
research). Additionally, it is possible that rising unemployment rates are seen as likely to increase
economic desperation, which, in turn, may be seen more as a driver of property than of violent crime—
perhaps explaining some of the enhanced P-PUNITIVENESS in the counties with faster-rising
unemployment.
108. This cautionary note is also supported by the Kleck and Jackson study described earlier.
See supra note 67.
109. This finding is consistent with the racial threat hypothesis. See supra Section II.A.
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do not point to a single underlying construct, was surprising because the same
questions have been used by many other researchers to measure
authoritarianism. Our difficulty in utilizing this approach in Wisconsin may
raise questions about the stability of the authoritarianism construct across time
and place.
Although we were unable to test Hypothesis 3 using a single
authoritarianism index, we did include each of the three underlying questions
as separate independent variables in our regression models. In both models, we
found a statistically significant association between V- and P-PUNITIVENESS
and agreement with one of the authoritarianism statements: “The ‘oldfashioned ways’ and ‘old-fashioned values’ still show the best way to live.”
However, there was no such association as to the other two statements. Thus,
we have found, at most, partial support for Hypothesis 3 insofar as Vpunitiveness was correlated with only one particular aspect or indicator of
authoritarianism.110
Hypothesis 4: Respondents who describe their “neighborhood” as
having low levels of collective efficacy tend to manifest higher levels of VPUNITIVE.
As with authoritarianism, our three collective-efficacy questions failed to
load into a single index (alpha = .499), which complicated the analysis of
Hypothesis 4. When we assessed each of the three questions as a separate
independent variable, we did not find that any were correlated with VPUNITIVE.111 This result dovetails with our earlier study that found only weak
and inconsistent relationships between support for truth-in-sentencing and a
110. It is possible that our mixed findings reflect distortions in the data created by “acquiescence
bias” among survey respondents, that is, the tendency for some respondents to answer questions with
agreement without regard to the substance of the question. See supra note 12. We note that the three
statements that we used to assess authoritarianism were framed differently. Affirmative responses to
the “old-ways” statement indicated authoritarianism, while affirmative responses to the other two
pointed in the opposite direction. (See supra note 85 for the full text of the three statements.)
Acquiescent answers would also tend to increase a respondent’s apparent punitiveness, so it may not
be surprising that we found an association between support for old ways and support for tough-oncrime policies. On the other hand, the use of reverse-framed statements did not prevent our racialresentment responses from loading onto a single index, which was correlated with punitiveness.
111. In this respect, there was a contrast with P-PUNITIVE, which was associated with one of
the collective-efficacy questions. More specifically, those individuals who agreed that their neighbors
would likely do something if kids were hanging out and skipping school in front of their house tended
to be more supportive of punitive responses to property crime. Notably, the association is in the reverse
direction from what was expected. An affirmative response to the question suggests that the respondent
perceived some collective efficacy in his or her neighborhood, which we have hypothesized should be
negatively correlated with punitiveness.
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different set of measures of neighborhood cohesion.112 These findings cut
against suggestions that individuals may view informal, neighborhood-level
social controls and formal, criminal-justice-based social controls as in some
sense substitutes for one another.
Hypothesis 5: Framing questions by providing specific illustrations of
violent crime reduces V-PUNITIVE.
We do not find support for Hypothesis 5 in these data. Based on the results
of difference of means tests, respondent punitiveness did not differ significantly
whether they were provided with specific examples of violent and property
offenses or not. This held true regardless whether we conducted difference of
means tests for the V-PUNITIVE index or for individual punitiveness
measures. In sum, providing respondents with clear examples of violent
offenses did not significantly shift respondents punitiveness towards violent
offenses. It is possible, of course, that different results might have been reached
if we had provided more or different illustrations.
Hypothesis 6: Punitiveness toward violent crime exceeds punitiveness
toward property crime.
Hypothesis 6 finds some support in our data. Table 4 compares the levels
of agreement with our V- and P-PUNITIVE statements.113 Statements 2(V) and
2(P) provide the most apt comparison. Between these two, we find almost three
times as many people supporting a norm of imprisonment for violent as for
property crime. Statements 1(V) and 1(P) also suggest greater punitiveness in
response to violent crime, although the difference is within the margin of error.
Additionally, the responses to 1(V) and 1(P) depend in part on the respondents’
beliefs regarding actual sentencing practices. Since these beliefs are not known,
it is hard to interpret the significance of a preference for tougher sentences.
Finally, 3(V) and 3(P) were structured quite differently, with the former asking
about life sentences and the latter about one-year sentences. In comparing 2(P)
and 3(P), however, it is notable that the apparent lenience of respondents toward
property crime seemed to evaporate when they were asked about repeat
offenses. It may be that all individuals who commit violent offenses are seen
as inherently belonging to the class of dangerous or hardened criminals, while
property offenders are placed into that category only when they persist after an
initial conviction.

112. O’Hear & Wheelock, supra note 10, at 282.
113. See Toplines, supra note 52, at 13–15.
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TABLE 4: PERCENT OF THE SAMPLE THAT AGREED WITH THE FOLLOWING
STATEMENTS FOR VIOLENT AND PROPERTY OFFENSES
Statement
1(V) In general, the courts are too lenient with individuals
who are convicted of violent crimes.
1(P) In general, the courts are too lenient with individuals
who are convicted of property crimes.
2(V) Individuals who have been convicted of a violent
crime should normally be sentenced to prison, even if it is a
first-time offense.
2(P) Individuals who have been convicted of a property
crime should normally be sentenced to prison, even if it is a
first-time offense.
3(V) Anyone who has been convicted of two or more
violent crimes should have to spend the rest of his or her
life in prison, with no exceptions.
3(P) Anyone who has been convicted of two or more
property crimes should have to spend at least one year in
prison, with no exceptions.

Agreement
55%
49%
69%
24%
38%
64%

VI. DISCUSSION
Research increasingly makes clear that long prison sentences are not
normally necessary from a public-safety perspective for individuals who have
been convicted of violent crimes.114 Yet, such sentences remain common in
practice.115 Given the dynamics of democratic accountability in the United
States, we suspect that official V-punitiveness may result in part from public Vpunitiveness. Reformers who wish to moderate punishment for violent crime
may thus need to take into account the existence, intensity, and sources of
public V-punitiveness.
Our findings suggest several lessons for such reformers. First, our
respondents did seem to recognize violent crime as a qualitatively distinct crime
category, most starkly in relation to first-time offenses. Although members of
114. See, e.g., Michael O’Hear, Third-Class Citizenship: The Escalating Legal Consequences of
Committing a “Violent” Crime, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 165, 231–32 (2019) (summarizing
research).
115. See, e.g., BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE
URBAN COUNTIES, 2009 – STATISTICAL TABLES, at 29 tbls.24, 25 (2013) (in study of felony cases in
seventy-five large urban counties, finding that 83% of the defendants who were convicted of violent
crimes received an incarcerative sentence, including the 57% who received a prison term; also finding
that the mean length of prison terms was ninety-one months, or a little over seven and one-half years).
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the public may be willing to indulge property offenders with second chances,
public preferences seem to run in the opposite direction when it comes to those
who have been convicted of violent offenses.
Second, although we suspect that V-punitiveness may result in part from a
tendency to associate “violent crime” with some of its most outrageous forms,
such as murder and predatory rape, we did not find any evidence that public
preferences change when policy questions are explicitly framed by reference to
less extreme forms of violence. This may suggest that the associations between
“violent crime” and worst-case scenarios are simply too entrenched to be
overcome by a few words from a survey-taker, or possibly that even the less
extreme forms of violence also evoke powerfully punitive responses.
Third, we found little reason to think that V-punitiveness may be moderated
through public education about the actual risk levels of violent offenders and
research on the most effective ways of reducing violent crime. Public education
on such topics might be a promising reform strategy if V-punitiveness were
fundamentally instrumental in character—that is, if people supported punitive
policies out of a belief that such policies would alleviate their risk of violent
victimization. To the extent that is a mistaken belief, correcting the belief
would presumably change the connected policy preferences. However, we did
not find an association between V-punitiveness and our primary measure of fear
of violent victimization, that is, perceived safety when walking alone at night.
Nor did we find an association between V-punitiveness and a respondent’s past
personal experiences with victimization, which would presumably tend to
increase the respondent’s fear of future victimization. Nor did we find an
association between V-punitiveness and county-level crime rate or crime
trends. Nor did we find support for the hypothesis that V-punitiveness is related
to a desire for stronger formal social controls in order to compensate for weak
collective efficacy.
Our only finding that suggests an instrumental basis for V-punitiveness was
the relationship between these policy preferences and a respondent’s perception
that violent crime was a “major problem” in his or her area of residence.
However, the overall weight of the evidence indicates that V-punitiveness is
grounded less in instrumental than in symbolic considerations, particularly
insofar as support for these policies is seen as a way of expressing a broader set
of beliefs about social organization, individual responsibility, and perceived
group differences.116
The latter observation points to a final lesson: in order to change the minds
of people who are currently skeptical of reform, it may be necessary for
116. This symbolic-ideological interpretation of V-punitiveness finds support in our results as to
Hypotheses 1–3.

OHEAR_WHEELOCK_12MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

VIOLENT CRIME AND PUNITIVENESS

5/14/2020 4:45 PM

1071

reformers to ensure that alternatives to long prison terms are not seen as
symbolically undercutting perceived traditional moral values like individual
accountability for wrongdoing. This may be quite challenging at a time when
life and near-life sentences have become such a normalized feature of our
criminal-justice system117—in this context, nonincarcerative sentences, and
even some years-long prison terms, may seem merely a “slap on the wrist.”
We do not see an easy solution to this dilemma. There may be some hope
in targeting groups of violent offenders whose circumstances do not fully
conform to the traditional assumptions in criminal law of a free and deliberate
choice to do wrong, such as offenders who are youthful or mentally ill. Indeed,
there are already substantial indications that punishment of young offenders in
the United States is growing less severe.118 Reformers may also take some
inspiration from the restorative justice movement, which has sought to develop
alternative ways of holding offenders accountable that involve less coercion
than traditional criminal-justice practices, but are actually more responsive to
victim needs.119 Although “RJ” programs have typically focused on nonviolent
offenses and youthful offenders, it may be possible to utilize the RJ approach
regarding individual accountability more broadly. On the other hand, while
focusing on young and mentally ill offenders, and drawing on RJ rhetoric and
practices, may hold some promise, reformers should exercise caution when
emphasizing racial justice as a primary justification for softening punishment
insofar as their proposals may then be seen by some as a form of group
favoritism that is inconsistent with individual responsibility.
VII. CONCLUSION
Survey research that elicits punitive responses to questions about crime in
general may miss important distinctions in public attitudes toward different
types of crime. In this Article, we have explored the nature of public
punitiveness toward violent crime in particular and found some areas of contrast
between punitive attitudes toward violent and property crime. In the end, we
see little indication that V-punitiveness is grounded in a person’s immediate
social circumstances, and more that this particular set of policy preferences is
connected to broader ideological orientations. Greater appreciation of these
dynamics may contribute to a more complete understanding of the rise and
potential fall of mass incarceration in the United States.
117. See ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING
USE OF LIFE AND LONG-TERM SENTENCES 5 (2017) (finding that 206,268 individuals are currently
serving life sentences or sentences of fifty years or more).
118. O’HEAR, PRISONS AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 2, at 140.
119. Id. at 59–60.

